We analyze a model of network formation where the costs of link formation are publicly known but individual benefits are not known to the social planner. The objective is to design a simple mechanism ensuring efficiency, budget balance and equity. We propose two mechanisms towards this end; the first ensures efficiency and budget balance but not equity. The second mechanism corrects the asymmetry in payoffs through a two-stage variant of the first mechanism. We also discuss an extension of the basic model to cover the case of directed graphs and give conditions under which the proposed mechanisms are immune to coalitional deviations. * We thank Francis Bloch, an associate editor and an anonymous referee for their comments on this paper. A previous version was written when Mutuswami was visiting CORE, Belgium. He thanks them for their support.
Introduction
The literature on network formation has mainly been concerned with finding ways of distributing the surplus from a network so as to reconcile the tension between efficiency and stability. In Operations Research, this is exemplified by the vast literature on the minimum spanning tree problem. 1 There is also a recent literature which focuses on the economic and social aspect of networks. This literature owes its genesis to the seminal paper by Jackson and Wolinsky [12] and has been explored by a number of other authors including Currarini and Morelli [4] and Dutta and Mutuswami [6] . 2 It differs from the Operations Research literature in that networks are thought to be bilateral relationships amongst agents rather than something material. However, the theme here is similar to that of the literature on the minimum spanning tree problem -to develop ways of sharing the surplus such that the surplus-maximizing network is also stable. 3 In both these literatures it is assumed that the benefits to individual agents from network formation are publicly known. This is a strong assumption and it is thus important to understand network formation when this condition is not satisfied. Our paper makes a first attempt in this direction by examining how a social planner can ensure the formation of an efficient network in a scenario where the costs of network formation are publicly known but an individual player's benefits from network formation are not known to him. As an example of where our approach may be valid, consider the minimum spanning tree problem. Assume, as in the traditional formulation of this problem, that the costs of network formation are common knowledge. Suppose that player 1's benefits from being connected to the source can take two possible values: a high value and a low value and that if player 1's benefits are low, then it is not socially optimal to provide her the input. Thus, the optimal network should not involve player 1 when her benefits from the input are low. The classical formulation of the problem does not take this aspect into consideration and proceeds as if player 1's benefit from the input is always high.
The fact that the social planner may not know the exact benefits of each agent from a given network forms the cornerstone of our analysis. The problem is one of mechanism design because there is asymmetric information between the planner and the agents. 4 We are interested in finding mechanisms through which an uninformed planner can nonetheless ensure three different objectives (i) efficiency, which means ensuring the formation of a network maximizing net social surplus at all preference profiles, (ii) budget balance, which means that the costs of network formation are met by the contributions of the agents themselves; and (iii) equity. We shall be more precise as to what we mean by equity later on; at this point, it suffices to say that we would like the net payoffs derived by the agents to correspond to the benefits that they derive from network formation.
Our formulation is general in that it can accomodate the Operations Research literature where the emphasis is on physical networks as well as the economic networks literature where a network is to interpreted as a set of bilateral relationships amongst agents. Our main result shows that a mechanism can be designed meeting all of the above three objectives under weak restrictions on preferences and technology.
We discuss two mechanisms in this paper. The first mechanism involves agents announcing sequentially. Each agent, when it is his turn to move, announces the set of links that she would like to see formed and a conditional cost contribution. Once all agents have announced, the planner selects the network to be formed and the cost shares of the agents. This mechanism ensures the formation of an efficient network but the net payoffs to the agents are asymmetric, being sensitive to the order in which agents announce. We then modify this mechanism in a way which makes the agents symmetric. This modified mechanism ensures the formation of an efficient network along with equitable net payoffs.
The mechanisms proposed in this paper are not intended to be descriptions of actual network formation situations. Our objective -as mentioned before -is to design a mechanism which is simple, efficient and which leads to a reasonable payoff for the agents. The approach adopted here thus differs from a recent literature on network formation which analyze link formation games with endogenous payoff determination. Our understanding is that the games analyzed there are meant to be stylized descriptions of actual network formation situations. We discuss the relationship of our work with this literature in detail in Section 8. In what follows, we set up the basic model in Section 2, the two mechanisms are introduced in Section 3 and analyzed in Section 4. Section 5 shows that the results obtained in Section 3 depend on the assumption that the utility functions are monotonic and shows how the mechanisms introduced in Section 3 can be modified to obtain identical results to those in Section 4. Section 6 discusses the extension to directed graphs and Section 7 dis-cusses the coalitional stability of the mechanisms. Section 8 discusses the relationship of our work with the literature on network formation with endogenous payoff determination and also a smaller literature on cost sharing in multicast trees. Section 9 concludes.
The Model
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be the set of agents. For any S ⊂ N , let g S be the set of all subsets of S of size 2: g S = {T |T ⊂ S, |T | = 2}. A graph or network, denoted generically by g is some subset of g N . In other words, a graph is a structure of bilateral relationships between the agents with i and j having a bilateral relationship if and only if {i, j} ∈ g. The element {i, j} of g is also called the link between i and j and denoted as (ij). For every S ⊂ N , let G S = {g|g ⊂ g S } denote the set of all graphs involving links only between members of S.
The following graph-theoretic terminology is needed for what follows. Players i and j are connected in the graph g if there exists a sequence of agents
There exists j such that (ij) ∈ g} denote the set of agents who are part of at least one link. The graph h ⊂ g is a connected component of g if all agents in N (h) are connected to each other in h, and for all i ∈ N (h), j ∈ N \N (h), (ij) ∈ g. The set of all connected components of g is denoted C(g).
The agents derive benefits from being part of a network; these benefits are given by a quasi-linear utility function U i (g,
Here, x i is interpreted as the cost share imputed to agent i. We impose the following restrictions on the function v i .
Assumption 1
The functions v i , i ∈ N are non-negative and monotonic. Formally, for all i ∈ N and all g,
Remark 1 Assumption 1 says that the gross benefit to an agent is nondecreasing in the set of links. This is a weak assumption because it only applies to situations where one graph is a subgraph of another. This assumption is satisfied in a number of models. For instance, in the minimum spanning tree problem where an agent gets a utility of V i if he is connected to the source and zero otherwise, satisfies Assumption 1.
There are, however, interesting models where Assumption 1 is not satisfied. In such cases, our mechanisms can be modified in an appropriate way. We shall show how this can be done later.
Finally, note that Assumption 1 allows for the presence of externalities across components. Thus, if i ∈ N (h), h ∈ C(g), then her utility can be affected by the formation of a link between two players in N \N (h).
The cost of establishing a network is given by a cost function c. We impose the following restrictions on the cost function.
Assumption 2
The cost function is non-negative and satisfies c(∅) = 0.
Assumption 2 amounts to saying that there are no fixed costs. This is a weak restriction.
Remark 2 Jackson and Wolinsky [12] use a framework where the object of analysis is a value function which is a real-valued mapping on the set of all possible networks, G N . The value function is the direct analogue of the characteristic function in cooperative game theory which is defined on the set of all coalitions. In particular cases -for instance, in their discussion of the symmetric connections and the co-author models -the value function is defined as the sum of all agents' net utilities where i's net utility is the difference between the gross benefits he receives from the graph and the cost of forming the links with which he is directly associated. Since we also work in a transferable utility framework, our setup can be translated into the value function framework by specifying the corresponding value function as
In what follows, we let S k , k = 1, . . . , n, denote the subset {k, k+1, . . . , n} of agents with S n+1 being the empty set. Player i's announcement in a mechanism is indicated by the use of a subscript as in v i , w i etc. The vector of announcement of all players is denoted as v, w etc. The term "announcement" shall be used to refer both to a player's announcement and the vector of announcements of all players and this will not lead to confusion because the context will make it clear as to which usage is relevant.
3 The Mechanisms Γ n and Γ 1 n Our formulation assumes that the technology (equivalently, the cost function) is commonly known in the society. On the other hand, the benefit functions of the agents are not known to the planner even while they are common knowledge in the rest of society. Undoubtedly, this is a strong assumption, corresponding to the "complete information" framework of Implementation Theory.
The mechanisms that we consider here require agents to move sequentially. We assume throughout that they move in the "natural order," viz. first, agent 1 moves, then 2, and so on. As will become clear, this is without loss of generality.
In the mechanism Γ n , players move sequentially and player i when it is her turn to move, announces a tuple w i = (g i , x i ) where g i ⊂ g N is the set of links that i wants to see formed and x i is her conditional cost contribution. The cost contribution is conditional in the sense that it is paid only if the resulting network g is a supergraph of g i .
Definition 1 The coalition
The first part of the definition says that each agent in S proposes links which only involve members of S. The second part says that the costs of forming the resulting graph are covered by the contributions of members of S. Given the announcement w, the planner selects the largest compatible coalition in the set {∅, S 1 , . . . , S n } which is called the maximal compatible coalition and denoted S * (w). He then forms the graph g * = ∪ i∈S * (w) g i , and charges the players as follows:
This completes the description of the mechanism Γ n . 6 The mechanism Γ 1 n operates in two stages. In the first stage, players play the game Γ n according to any (arbitrarily chosen) order of the agents. At the end of the first stage, each player is asked whether she is satisfied with her payoff or if she wants to replay the game. If all players answer "NO," then the game ends. Otherwise, the game Γ n is replayed according to a randomly chosen order of the players with equal probability for each order. The game Γ 1 n ends after this optional second stage.
4 Analysis of the mechanisms Γ n and Γ
n
We start with the following definitions.
Definition 2
The stand alone payoff for a coalition S is defined as
If g is efficient for N , then g will simply be called an efficient graph.
Remark 3 Definition 2 implies that in computing the stand alone payoff for S, we assume that the agents in N \S are isolated. This is unproblematic so long as there are no consumption or cost externalities across components. Our formulation, though, does not rule out these possibilities. If there are externalities across components, then there is no unambiguous way to measure the worth of a coalition. One faces a similar problem in defining the characteristic function game of a pure public good economy.
Remark 4 Assumption 1 implies that if S ⊂ T then sa(S) ≤ sa(T ).
This follows from the simple observation that since a graph g * S which is efficient for S involves links only between members of S, the coalition T can always form g * S .
We therefore have sa(
The first inequality follows because g * S typically will not achieve the stand alone payoff for T . The second inequality follows because v i (g * S ) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ T \S by Assumption 1.
Our main results regarding the mechanisms Γ n and Γ 1 n can be summarized in the following theorems.
Theorem 1 Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisfied. Then, all SPE of Γ n result in the formation of an efficient graph. The net payoffs to the agents in all SPE are given by the marginal contribution vector (u * 1 , . . . , u * n ).
Theorem 2 Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisfied. Then, all SPE of Γ 1 n result in the formation of an efficient graph. The net payoffs to the agents in all SPE are given by the Shapley value of the TU-game (N, sa).
Remark 5 Note that Theorems 1 and 2 do not specify the equilibrium strategies uniquely. If there are a number of possible efficient graphs, then they do not say anything about which efficient graph forms in equilibrium either. However, they are able to pin down the equilibrium net payoffs uniquely.
Consider first, the mechanism Γ n . Suppose that agents in {1, . . . , k} have already announced
. . , k} be the largest integer such that there exists a graph g ∈ G S i k satisfying
Note that equation (2) says that by utilizing the contributions of agents in {i k , . . . , k}, the agents in S k+1 can collectively obtain a payoff greater than their stand-alone payoff. In Lemma 1 we show that if this condition is satisfied, then the formed maximal compatible coalition must include all agents from i k to n. We need a last piece of notation before stating and proving Lemma 1. Suppose that i k exists; then G * k = {g ∈ G S i k |g satisfies (1) and (2) }.
in the game Γ n . Suppose also that i k exists. Then, all SPE of the subgame following k's announcement will be such that the resulting maximal compatible coalition is a superset of S i k .
Proof: We shall show by induction, that if S i k is not a compatible coalition in some SPE of the subgame following k's announcement, then there exists a profitable deviation for some agent in S k+1 . If k = n, then there is no subgame following n's announcement as there no agents announcing after n. 7 It is easy to check that in this case, (1) and (2) imply that S in is a compatible coalition. It follows from the definition that the maximal compatible coalition must be a superset of S in .
Suppose that the lemma is true for all k > K but that S i K is not a compatible coalition in some SPE of the subgame following K's announcement. Let (u K+1 , . . . , u n ) be the resulting net utilities of the agents following K. The definition of i K implies that n j=K+1 u j ≤ sa(S K+1 ). We can distinguish between two cases here. Case 1: u j < u * j for some j ∈ {K + 1, . . . , n}. Let agent j deviate by announcing (g j , x j ) where g j is an efficient graph for S j and x j is such that
Observe that the upper bound on x j is strictly greater than the lower bound if and only if u j < sa(S j ) − sa(S j+1 ) = u * j which is true by assumption. 8 Thus, a value of x j satisfying (3) exists. Since
, it follows that i j exists after j's deviation. The induction hypothesis implies that the maximal compatible coalition resulting from any SPE of the subgame following j's deviation will be a superset of S i j . Since i j ≤ j, it follows that j is always a member of the maximal compatible coalition. Compatibility implies that the resulting graph, sayg, will be such that g j ⊂g. Assumption 1 implies that v j (g) − x j ≥ v j (g j ) − x j > u j . This shows that j has a profitable deviation. 7 Remember that agents are assumed to announce in the order 1, 2, . . . , n. 8 Since gj is efficient for Sj, we have n k=j vj(gj) − c(gj) = sa(Sj).
Note that the upper bound on x K+1 is strictly bigger than the lower bound if and only if
). This is true because i K exists (by assumption); and therefore a value of x K+1 satisfying (4) exists.
Since
, it follows that i K+1 exists after K + 1's deviation. The induction hypothesis implies that the maximal compatible coalition resulting from any SPE of the subgame following K + 1's deviation must be a superset of S i K+1 . Since i K+1 ≤ K + 1, it follows that K + 1 is always a member of the maximal compatible coalition. By compatibility, the resulting graph, sayg, must be a supergraph of g * K . By Assumption 1, we have
which shows that K + 1 has a profitable deviation and completes the proof of the lemma.
Corollary 1 Let (u 1 , . . . , u n ) be the net payoffs to the agents in some SPE of Γ n . Then, u i ≥ u * i for all i ∈ N .
Proof: Suppose u k < u * k for some k in some SPE of Γ n . Let k deviate by announcing (g k , x k ) where g k is efficient for S k and x k such that
, it follows that i k exists after k's deviation. By Lemma 1, it follows that the maximal compatible coalition from any SPE of the resulting subgame is a superset of S i k . Since i k ≤ k, k is always a member of the maximal compatible coalition. By compatibility, the resulting graph g must be a supergraph of g k and by Assumption 1, it follows that k has a profitable deviation, a contradiction. Proof of Theorem 1: Let (u 1 , . . . , u n ) be the net payoffs to the agents in an SPE of Γ n . Corollary 1 implies that u i ≥ u * i for all i ∈ N . If u i > u * i for some i, then n j=1 u j > sa(N ) which is a contradiction since Remark 4 (which uses Assumptions 1 and 2) shows that the maximum surplus attainable is sa(N ). Thus, u i = u * i for all i ∈ N . The fact that an efficient network forms follows trivially from the observation that
Proof of Theorem 2: Let (φ 1 (sa), . . . , φ n (sa)) denote the Shapley value payoffs in the game (N, sa). Suppose the game enters Stage 2 of Γ 1 n . We know from Theorem 1, that for any order selected by the planner, the SPE payoffs will be given by the "marginal contribution" vector. Since each order is equally likely, it follows that the expected payoff to any agent at the beginning of the second stage is exactly his Shapley value in the game (N, sa). Consider now the agents' decisions at the beginning of Stage 1. If any agent gets less than her Shapley value payoff at the end of Stage 1, then she will force the game into the second stage. Thus, if g * N is an efficient graph, then the strategy profile ({(g * N , x * i )}, "NO")
n . However, this may not be a unique SPE as it is possible that some agent is indifferent between the game ending in the first stage and getting his Shapley value payoff and getting the same payoff in expected terms in Stage 2. (Note that an efficient network forms in either case.) If we assume that all agents have a lexicographic preference for the game ending in the first stage, then all SPE of the game Γ 1 n will end in the first stage with the formation of an efficient network and the agents getting their Shapley value payoffs. 9 Remark 6 If agents discount the future instead of having a lexicographic preference for the game ending in stage 1, then the game Γ 1 n always ends in the first stage and the payoffs approach the Shapley value as the discount factor approaches one.
Let 0 < β < 1 be the discount factor. If the game Γ 1 n reaches the second stage, then the expected payoffs to the agents at the beginning of Stage 2 are obviously β(φ 1 (sa), . . . , φ n (sa)). Thus, if i's payoff at the end of stage 1 is strictly less than βφ i (sa), then she will move the game to the second stage. Therefore, the optimal strategy for player i in stage 1 is to announce so as to leave exactly the second stage payoffs ( n j=i+1 βφ j (sa)) to the agents following her. Using the argument recursively, it follows that agent 1 will expropriate the entire surplus that accrues on account of time discounting. Note that the game cannot go to the second stage because agent 1 would prefer to concede a little to the agents following her rather than having the game go to the second stage. 10 In other words, with discounting, the game Γ 1 n always ends in the first stage and the net payoffs are given by (sa(N ) − β n j=2 φ j (sa), βφ 2 (sa), . . . , βφ n (sa)). Thus, as β → 1, the payoffs converge to the Shapley value. 9 The assumption that all agents have a lexicographic preference for the game ending in the first stage is also used by Bag and Winter [2] in their analysis of production and cost sharing of an excludable public good.
10 If the game does go to a second stage, then agent 1 can deviate by conceding a fraction 0 < α < 1 of the surplus (S = sa(N ) − β n j=2 φj(sa)) to the agents following her, agent 2 can follow by conceding some fraction of αS to the subsequent agents and so on. This ensures that the game ends in the first stage and agent 1 is strictly better off from the deviation. This argument has been used before in Bag and Winter [2] and is implicitly used in Lemma 1 and Corollary 1.
Remark 7 Jackson and Wolinsky [12] propose a way of allocating the surplus from a network which also uses the Shapley value. Their rule is defined as follows. Given g and ∅ = S ⊆ N , let g|S = {{i, j}|{i, j} ∈ g and {i, j} ⊂ S}. Define the game (N, v g ) by v g (S) = i∈S u i (g|S)−c(g|S). The JacksonWolinsky allocation rule is then the Shapley value of (N, v g ). 11 Note that while the Jackson-Wolinsky procedure specifies the sharing rule for every possible graph, our procedure is valid only for efficient graphs. However, even on the domain of efficient graphs, the two rules differ. This is illustrated by the following example.
, and (ii) the efficient graphs for {i, j} is {{i, j}}. The stand alone payoffs are as follows: sa({i}) = 0 for all i, sa({1, 2}) = sa({1, 3} = 25, sa({2, 3}) = 5 and sa(N ) = 48. Using Theorem 2, it follows that the net payoffs to the agents in any SPE of Γ 1 n are given by the Shapley value of (N, sa) which works out to (φ 1 , φ 2 , φ 3 ) = (136/6, 76/6, 76/6).
The Jackson-Wolinsky procedure applied to g 1 gives (146/6, 71/6, 71/6), to g 2 gives (111/6, 126/6, 51/6), and to g 3 gives (111/6, 51/6, 126/6). Thus, the equilibrium payoffs are always different from those obtained from the Jackson-Wolinsky procedure. The difference is on account of the fact that the computation of a player's "marginal contribution" differs in the two procedures. While we compute the "marginal contribution" for a player by looking at the difference in stand-alone payoffs (sa(S ∪ i) − sa(S)), the Jackson-Wolinsky procedure for a given graph g looks at the difference in the values of the graph restricted to the coalitions S ∪ i and S, that is, v g (S ∪ i) − v g (S). The two procedures are bound to give different answers since g|S will typically not be the graph that achieves the stand-alone payoff for S even when g is efficient for the grand coalition.
Non-Monotonic Utility Functions
Theorems 1 and 2 depend crucially on Assumption 1 which requires the gross benefit function of an agent to be monotonic. The following example 11 The framework used by Jackson and Wolinsky [12] is different from that used here. The definition given here corresponds "naturally" to the Jackson-Wolinsky rule in the context of our model. The Jackson-Wolinsky rule itself is an extension of the value proposed by Myerson [16] for "graph-restricted" games.
based on the co-author model of Jackson and Wolinsky [12] illustrates this point.
Example 2 Let N = {1, 2, 3}. Given a graph g, let n k denote the number of links involving player k. Denote by g i the graph {{i, j}, {i, k}}. The utility of agent k, k = 1, 2, 3 is given by
otherwise. (5) It is quite easy to verify that u k is not monotonic and that the unique efficient graph is g 1 . Let c(g) = 0 for all g. The stand alone payoffs for the various coalitions are as follows: sa(N ) = 8, sa({i, j}) = 6, sa({i}) = 0. Let the agents move in the order 1, 2, 3. Observe that if g 1 is to form in equilibrium, then agent 1's announcement must be of the form {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, x}. Now, note that 2 and 3 each gets a gross payoff of 2 in g 1 and a gross payoff of 2.5 in the inefficient graph g N . Therefore, if 2 announces so as to induce g 1 , then she can get a net payoff of at most x + 2 + 2 = x + 4 which is the sum of her own gross payoff in g 1 and the amounts that can be extracted from 1 and 3. However, she can do better by announcing (for example) {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}, −(2 + x)}. It is easy to check that (one of) 3's optimal strategy is to now announce {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}, 2} which leads to the graph g N and a net payoff vector of (2.5−x, 4.5+x, 0.5). Thus, all SPE (conditional on the agents moving in the order 1,2,3 or 1,3,2) involve inefficient graphs.
The problem here is that while agent 1 does have say with regard to what links she wants to see formed, she has no say with regard to links she does not want to see formed. In this case, agent 1 would like 2 and 3 to not form the link {2, 3} but there is no way to accomplish this. No matter how much agent 1 offers to contribute, agents 2 and 3 will always form the link {2, 3} since their gross payoff in the complete graph is higher. This problem does not arise when the utility function is monotonic because an agent would never have to compensate agents moving later to not form a link.
The obvious "fix" here is to allow each agent to specify the entire graph which she would like to see formed, not just the links that she wants to see formed. An announcement of player i in the modified game Γ m is then w i = (g i , x i ) where g i is the graph that i wants to be formed and x i her cost contribution if g i does get formed. A coalition S is now compatible if (i) all agents in S want the same graph g ∈ G S to be established; and (ii) i∈S x i ≥ c(g). The maximal compatible coalition is defined as before. If Γ 1 m is the two-stage version of Γ m (in the same way that Γ 1 n was a two-stage version of Γ n ), then we have the following result. Proof: The proof is omitted since it is almost the same as the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2.
Directed Graphs
So far, our analysis has focused on situations where the links are nondirectional. However, some contexts, for example, information acquisition, can be modelled as situations involving directed links. Directed graphs have been analyzed in a couple of recent papers, notably those of Bala and Goyal [3] and Dutta and Jackson [5] We now show that the mechanisms Γ n and Γ 1 n work equally well when the links are directed. Letḡ S be the collection of all elements in S × S excluding those of the form (i, i). In other words,ḡ S = {(i, j) ∈ S × S|i = j}. We can think of g N as the complete directed graph on N . A directed graph g is then some subset ofḡ N . The element (i, j) of g is referred to as the link from i to j and denoted by (ij). (Note that in this notation, (ij) and (ji) are different.) LetḠ S be the set of all graphs involving links only between members of S: g ∈Ḡ S and (ij) ∈ g implies that {i, j} ⊂ S.
A path from i to j in g is a sequence of distinct agents {i 0 , . . . , i K } such that i 0 = i, i K = j and (i k i k+1 ) ∈ g for all k = 0, . . . , K − 1. Let µ i (g) = {j = i|∃ a path from i to j}. As before, the utility function of i is given by U i (g) = v i (g) − x i where v i (g) is i's gross benefit from g and x i is his cost share. The following assumption, which is a direct analogue of Assumption 1, is imposed on v i .
Assumption 3 The function v i is non-negative and monotonic for all
Remark 8 Assumption 3 implies that i is not made worse-off by links that other agents establish to her. Note that if monotonicity is violated, then we could have a problem similar to that illustrated in Section 5. The "fix" in this case would be a similar one as well.
The cost function is assumed to satisfy Assumption 2. An announcement of i is now a tuple (g i , x i ) where g i ⊂ḡ N is the set of links that i wants to see formed and x i is his contribution towards network formation.
Definition 5 The coalition S is compatible with the announcement w
The maximal compatible coalition is defined as before: it is the largest compatible coalition in the set {∅, S 1 , . . . , S n }. It is straightforward, with these modified definitions, to prove the equivalents of Lemma 1 and Corollary 1 in this context. The proofs are omitted. We can now state the following combined result as the analogue of Theorems 1 and 2. The proof is omitted as it involves similar arguments to those in Theorems 1 and 2 Theorem 4 Suppose that Assumptions 2 and 3 are satisfied. Then, all SPE of Γ n and Γ 1 n result in the formation of efficient graphs. The net utility levels achieved by the agents in all SPE of Γ n is given by the "marginal contribution" vector (u * 1 , . . . , u * n ) and in Γ 1 n by the Shapley value of the TUgame (N, sa).
Coalition Stability
Immunity to deviations by coalition is a desirable property of any mechanism. Unfortunately, our mechanisms do not possess this property, as the following example illustrates.
Example 3 Consider a minimum spanning tree problem with four agents (1, 2, and 3) and a source (agent 0). 12 The cost function is additive in the set of links and the cost of establishing links are as follows: c({0, 1}) = 2, c({0, 2}) = 50, c({0, 3}) = 4, c({1, 2}) = 3, c({1, 3}) = 50, c({2, 3}) = 3.5. It is easily confirmed that the unique efficient network is g * = {{0, 1}, {1, 2}, {2, 3}}. Assume that each agent gets a utility of V > 50 if she is connected to the source and zero otherwise. A simple computation shows that sa(1) = V − 2, sa(2) = V −100, sa(3) = V −4, sa(12) = 2V −5, sa(13) = 2V −6, sa(23) = 2V − 7.5 and sa(N ) = 3V − 8.5. Suppose that the agents move in the order 1, 3, 2. The reader can confirm that the following strategy profile constitutes a SPE of Γ n : {(g * , 1), (g * , −42.5), (g * , 50)}. However, in this SPE, agents 1 and 2 collectively pay $51 even though they can connect themselves to the source at a cost of only $5! This illustrates the fact that the outcomes resulting from Γ n and Γ 1 n may be vulnerable to coalitional deviations. Thus, in general, our mechanisms will not be immune to coalitional deviations. However, if the TU-game (N, sa) is convex, then our mechanisms will be coalitionally stable: this follows from the well-known result that in convex games, the "marginal contribution" vector, and hence, the Shapley value vector are both core points. The following conditions, which are analogues of corresponding conditions identified by Moulin [15] for excludable public good economies, guarantee that the game (N, sa) is convex. 12 The source is a non-strategic agent, as in the classic formulation of the problem.
The following lemma follows directly from the definitions of supermodularity and submodularity and its proof is hence omitted. Lemma 2 Suppose that v i is supermodular, non-negative and satisfies v i (∅) = 0 for all i ∈ N and that the cost function c is submodular. Then the TUgame (N, sa) is convex.
Remark 9
The conditions imposed in Lemma 2 while strong, are not trivial. For instance, additive cost functions (of the type used in Example 3) satisfy submodularity. An example of a utility function satisfying supermodularity is one where an agent's utility is a convex, increasing function of the number of people to whom he is connected directly.
We end this section with the following result.
Theorem 5
Suppose that v i is non-negative, supermodular and satisfies v i (∅) = 0 for all i ∈ N and that c is submodular. Then, all SPE of Γ n and Γ 1 n result in the formation of an efficient network. The net payoffs in all SPE of Γ n are given by the "marginal contribution" vector and in Γ 1 n by the Shapley value of the TU-game (N, sa) . Furthermore, all SPE of Γ n and Γ 1 n are coalitionally stable.
Proof: The proofs of the first two parts follow from Theorems 1 and 2. Coalition stability follows from Lemma 2.
Relationship with the Literature
The influential paper of Jackson and Wolinsky [12] had two distinct characteristics. One, it used an extension of the cooperative game framework where the "value function" was the natural analogue of the characteristic function. Second, the allocation rule was exogenous. The research question posed by Jackson and Wolinsky [12] was whether an allocation rule could be designed so that agents acting in their own interest would form an efficient network. Recent research has relaxed the Jackson-Wolinsky framework by explicitly introducing costs of link formation and also endogenizing the payoffs but the approach for the most part has been to analyze games which are regarded as stylized descriptions of actual network formation processes. Our paper is related to this strand of research but it differs from the existing literature in looking at the problem as one of mechanism design. The fact that we look at the problem as one of mechanism design and not as a stylized description of actual network formation situations means that certain issues which arise naturally in the latter context are of less importance here. For instance, issues like robustness of our results with respect to the game form, or whether our game is descriptive of real life network formation situations are of less importance in a mechanism design approach. 13 On the other hand, the simplicity of the mechanism and the fact that it can be implemented within a finite number of periods are of major importance in the mechanism design approach.
As an alternative to our finite horizon mechanism one might be interested in infinite horizon (bargaining type) models of the sort used by some authors to address coalition formation. We have not chosen this avenue here for two reasons. First since our objective is not to model how network are formed but rather to propose a simple mechanism of network formation that guarantees efficiency we view the finiteness of the mechanism as an advantage rather than a drawback. Secondly and on a more technical level it has been shown by several authors that multilateral (infinite horizon) bargaining models often give rise to inefficient equilibria. This was demonstrated among others by Okada [17] , Seidmann and Winter [18] and in the context of a model supporting the Shapley value by Gul [10] . Indeed, as a descriptive model of network formation infinite horizon bargaining model may turn out to be a very useful tool. A challenging task would then be to characterize the environments under which the bargaining give rise to efficient networks. However this approach is outside the scope of the current paper.
Currarini and Morelli [4] have independently developed a sequential link formation game with endogenous payoff determination in the JacksonWolinsky framework. 14 In their model, agents announce sequentially and agent i's announcement is a tuple specifying the subset of agents with whom she would like to establish links and a payoff demand. The payoff demand can be either an absolute claim on the total surplus or a vector specifying a claim for each proposed link or a number specifying a share of the total surplus. Currarini and Morelli [4] show that if the value function is size monotonic and the payoff demand is either an absolute claim on total surplus or a vector of "bilateral" claims, then all SPE lead to the formation of efficient networks.
Our model is different from that of Currarini and Morelli in a number of aspects. First, the mechanisms differ in terms of the agents announcements and in the outcomes they implement. While Currarini and Morelli only require that an agent announce the set of links that she wants to form, we allow an agent to announce the complete set of links that she wants to see formed. We thus allow an agent to have some say about links not in-volving the agent herself. This may appear strange, but it should be noted that the formation of links not involving the agent herself can impact an agent in a very negative way. In this context, it should be noted that since the subgraph relation is only a partial order, monotonicity is not actually a strong assumption. It is not difficult to construct an example with monotonic utility functions in which announcing just the set of links that an agent wants to form along with cost contributions results in inefficiency. In terms of outcomes, the two mechanisms analyzed here yield the "marginal contributions" vector and the Shapley value (with respect to an appropriate cooperative game) respectively. The games analyzed by Currarini and Morelli do not yield these outcomes.
Secondly, Currarini and Morelli [4] require that the value function be both anonymous and component additive. These assumptions rule out externalities between components, but as discussed in Section 2, we do allow for such externalities in the utility and cost functions. Neither do we impose any sort of symmetry a priori on the agents.
More importantly, the game Γ n -unlike the Currarini-Morelli game Γ 1 (v) -is not invariant to the "net payoff" function. 15 This is illustrated below. 
if g = {{i, j}},
Consider now a different model with the following specifications.
It can be checked that {ū i } i∈N andc give rise to the same value function as that in (6) . However, {ū i } i∈N andc satisfy Assumptions 1 and 2 and therefore Theorems 1 and 2 imply that both Γ n and Γ 1 n yield g 1 in all SPE. In contrast, Example 2 yields different networks in equilibrium.
In general, given any value function v satisfying v(∅) ≥ 0, we can always find utility and cost functions satisfying Assumptions 1 and 2 which give rise to v. Indeed, letting M > max g∈G v(g), we can select the utility and cost functions as follows:
On the other hand, there are circumstances where the Currarini-Morelli game Γ 1 (v) gives rise to efficient graphs while our mechanisms do not do so. An example is the Jackson-Wolinsky co-author model with |N | = 3, a modified version of which was discussed in Example 2. 17 The value function of this example satisfies size monotonicity and hence by Theorem 2 of Currarini and Morelli [4] , all SPE of Γ 1 (v) give rise to efficient graphs. 18 The important point here is that 'claims on net payoffs' is different from 'contribution towards cost' and size monotonicity neither implies nor is implied by our Assumptions 1 and 2.
Johnson and Gilles [14] examine a model of costly network formation based on the symmetric connections model of Jackson and Wolinsky [12] . In their model, an individual's gross benefits from a graph is given by a utility function whose specification is the same as the symmetric connections model of Jackson and Wolinsky [12] . The agents are assumed to be located on a line and the cost of linking agents i and j is given by a cost topology which has the feature that the cost of establishing a link is less if the two agents are "near" to each other. As in Jackson and Wolinsky [12] , the net benefit of an agent is the difference between his gross benefits and the total cost associated with those links in which she is involved. Johnson and Gilles [14] characterize the set of pairwise stable graphs as well as the set of efficient graphs in their model and show that they may not coincide. They then analyze a sequential move game and show that under certain conditions on parameters, one can find an order of moves such that the corresponding SPE involves a pairwise stable graphs. In the Johnson-Gilles game, a pair of agents move at each stage, in a manner similar to the game analyzed by Aumann and Myerson [1] . However, in contrast to the analysis in this paper as well as that in Currarini and Morelli [4] , the Johnson-Gilles game is a pure linking game where the only decision for an agent at any stage is whether or not to form the link with the other agent with whom he is paired.
Since no transfers are allowed between agents, it is not surprising that the SPE of the Johnson-Gilles game need not give rise to efficient graphs which was one of our prime objectives. 19 Slikker and van den Nouweland [20] have also analyzed network formation with endogenous payoff determination but they have used a simultaneous move game to do so. In their game, agents simultaneously announce a subset of agents with whom they wish to link as well as a payoff claim. Slikker and van den Nouweland [20] confine themselves to value functions which can be derived from cooperative games. 20 Their main result is that the equilibrium graph will not have cycles and that a player may not be able to profit from a "central" position in the graph. In another paper, Slikker and van den Nouweland [19] , again confining themselves to value functions derived from cooperative games, examine a game similar to the Johnson-Gilles one when there is a fixed cost c > 0 of forming a link and the allocation rule is given by the Myerson value. They show that as costs increase, the pattern of the resulting equilibrium graph depends on whether the underlying cooperative game is superadditive and/or convex. These papers have a somewhat different focus than ours and the results obtained there are not really comparable to our results.
Finally, our paper is related to the tiny literature in computer science on cost sharing in multicast trees examined in the works of Feigenbaum, Papadimitriou and Shenker [7] , Herzog, Shenker and Estrin [11] and Jain and Vazirani [13] . The problem of multicast transmission involves a given computer network and a set of users who each desire to receive a message (like a movie). The willingness to pay for the message of any agent is private information. The planner's problem is to design a mechanism (typically, the literature focuses on dominant strategy mechanisms) which elicits the willingness to pay of each agent, then selects the subset of agents to receive the message, a way of routing the message to this subset of agents and an assignment of costs (the sum of the costs of the links used in the selected route) across the agents. The works cited above show that there are no dominant strategy and efficient mechanisms (a result similar to that obtained by Green and Laffont [9] ) and focus on dominant strategy mechanisms which are budget balanced but inefficient. One important component of these works is the attention given to computability: the papers of Feigenbaum, Papadimitriou and Shenker [7] and Jain and Vazirani [13] both contain explicit algorithms for implementing the mechanisms. This is important because determining the optimal route for any subset of agents is known to be computationally 19 Johnson and Gilles [14] refer to their result as an 'implementation' result which it is, in one sense. However, it is not clear why they rule out transfers amongst agents. Our result indicates that the planner can do better by allowing for such transfers. 20 A value function v is said to be derived from a cooperative game if the following holds: v(g) = v(g ) ⇔ for every h ∈ C(g), there exists h ∈ C(g ) such that N (h) = N (h ). Thus, two connected components with the same player set have the same value.
NP-hard. Economists have not paid much attention to computability but the papers of Bala and Goyal [3] and Johnson and Gilles [14] which contain simulation results illustrate the complex computations involved in even the simplest examples. We have two observations with regard to the literature on multicast trees. First, given our "complete information" assumption, it is not surprising that we obtain more positive results: in particular, we obtain efficiency and to an extent, also equity. Second, regarding computability, it is difficult to say anything given the generality of our model though it is obviously an important issue.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have examined a model of network formation with costs where individual benefits from network formation are not known to the planner. The cost function is assumed to be common knowledge in the society. We have proposed two mechanisms for this problem with quasi-linear and monotonic preferences. The only restrictions imposed on the cost function are that there are no fixed costs. In both mechanisms, players move sequentially. Each agent's announcement is a tuple consisting of the set of people with whom he wants to form links, and a monetary contribution, interpreted as the player's contribution towards the cost of network formation. Our first mechanism ensures the formation of an efficient network in all subgame perfect Nash equilibria; however the net payoffs to the agents are asymmetric. In general, agents moving earlier are better off than agents moving later. The second mechanism corrects for this asymmetry and ensures not only the formation of efficient networks but also equitable net payoffs. We also discuss the extension of the basic model to cover the case of non-monotonic preferences and directed graphs. Finally, we discuss conditions under which the mechanisms we propose are immune to coalitional deviations.
